

Message Text

PAGE 01 NATO 00427 01 OF 04 271902Z

63

ACTION EUR-12

INFO OCT-01 ISO-00 SS-15 NSC-05 CIAE-00 PM-03 INR-07 L-02

ACDA-05 NSAE-00 PA-01 RSC-01 PRS-01 SP-02 USIA-06

TRSE-00 SAJ-01 OMB-01 EB-07 COME-00 MC-01 /071 W

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TO SECDEF WASHDC

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C O N F I D E N T I A L SECTION 1 OF 4 USNATO 0427

E.O. 11652: GDS

TAGS: MPOL, NATO

SUBJ: NUNN AMENDMENT STANDARDIZATION REPORT

SECDEF FOR ODDR&E (MR. BASIL)

BEGIN SUMMARY: MESSAGE PROVIDES INFORMATION RELEVANT TO SUBJECT REPORT WHICH MR. BASIL REQUESTED BY TELEPHONE FROM NATO ASSISTANT SECRETARY GENERAL FOR DEFENSE SUPPORT (DR. TUCKER). END SUMMARY.

1. NATO ASSISTANT SECRETARY GENERAL FOR DEFENSE SUPPORT (DR. TUCKER) HAS REQUESTED MISSION TO SEND FOLLOWING INFORMATION RELATIVE TO NUNN AMENDMENT STANDARDIZATION REPORT TO MR. BASIL.

QUOTE

1. FOLLOWING DOCUMENTS MAY BE HELPFUL

A. ADDENDUM TO SUMMARY CNAD RECORD (AC/259-R/13 OF 31 DEC 74)

B. DOCUMENT AC/259-D/401, AC/141-D/291 OF 22 NOV 1974.

2. I ADDRESSED THE NATO DEFENSE COLLEGE ON 18 DEC 1974, INTER-ALIA, AS FOLLOWS:

QUOTE:

TO-DAY THE CAPABILITY OF ALLIED FORCES TO OPERATE TOGETHER IS SERIOUSLY CONSTRAINED BY THE HETEROGENEITY OF EQUIPMENT AND THE INCONSISTENCY OF TACTICAL DOCTRINE.

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PAGE 02 NATO 00427 01 OF 04 271902Z

LET US RETURN TO THE POSSIBLE ATTACK ON, SAY, THE BELGIAN OR DUTCH SECTORS OF THE FRONT. THE COVERING FORCES COULD HOLD OUT AGAINST A MAJOR BUILD-UP FOR ONLY A FEW DAYS.

THEN THEIR MUNITIONS WOULD BE EXHAUSTED AND THEIR FORCES
OUTNUMBERED. THEY MUST BE REINFORCED* WHETHER THE
REINFORCEMENTS COME FROM BRITISH, AMERICAN, FRENCH OR GERMAN
FORCES, THERE WILL BE MAJOR INCOMPATIBILITIES OF WEAPONS.
GUNS WILL BE OF DIFFERENT CALIBRE. THUS EACH NATION MUST
HAVE ITS OWN LOGISTICS TAIL* THE REINFORCING FORCE MAY NOT
BE ABLE TO SUPPLY MUNITIONS TO THE GUNS OF THE COVERING
FORCE, NOT TO SUPPLY ITS OWN GUNS FROM THE LOCAL STOCKPILES.
MUNITIONS ARE IN SHORT SUPPLY THROUGHOUT NATO, BUT OFTEN
THEY CAN'T BE SHARED. THERE IS EVEN A LACK OF COMMONALITY
OF COMPONENTS AND SUB-ASSEMBLIES SO THAT GENERALLY EACH
NATION MUST MAINTAIN ITS OWN EQUIPMENT WITH ITS OWN INVENTORY
OF SPARE PARTS.

BUT THE SITUATION IS EVEN WORSE. CONSIDER THE
TACTICAL COMMUNICATIONS AND COMMAND AND CONTROL SYSTEMS
WHICH DIFFER, AND NECESSITATE AWKWARD INTERFACES. IT IS
NOT JUST A QUESTION OF ELECTRONIC INCOMPATIBILITY OF SIGNAL
LEVELS AND FORMS. IT IS NOT JUST THE PROBLEM OF TRANSLATIONS
AMONGST ENGLISH, FRENCH, GERMAN, DUTCH, ITALIAN, GREEK,
PORTUGUESE OR TURKISH LANGUAGES. THE MESSAGE FORMATS AND
THE MEANINGS OF SYMBOLS SOMETIMES DIFFER AND ARE INCONSISTENT.
THEREFORE THE INTERFACES MUST BE STAFFED BY EXPERTS FROM EACH
NATION. THEREFORE THEY MUST BE LOCATED AT RELATIVELY HIGH
LEVELS IN THE COMMAND STRUCTURE. THEN MESSAGES MUST MAKE
THEIR WAY UP ONE NATIONAL NETWORK, ACROSS AN INTERFACE, AND
BACK DOWN ANOTHER NATIONAL NET, TO EFFECT CO-ORDINATED JOINT
TACTICAL OPERATIONS.

OR CONSIDER TACTICAL AIR. THE GREAT VIRTUE OF
TACTICAL AIR IS THE RAPIDITY WITH WHICH IT CAN BE CONCENTRATED
WHENEVER A MAJOR ATTACK OR A BREAKTHROUGH OCCURS. WITH
INFRASTRUCTURE FUNDS WE HAVE BUILT OR ADAPTED A NETWORK OF
220 NATO AIRFIELDS ALL ACROSS ACE. MOST OF THESE AIRFIELDS
ARE EQUIPPED TO SERVICE MOST NATO TACTICAL AIRCRAFT BY
RECHARGING THEIR SYSTEMS WITH FUEL, OIL, AIR, OXYGEN, NITROGEN,
ETC. AND BY RE-ARMING THEM WITH "IRON" GRAVITY BOMBS AND
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PAGE 03 NATO 00427 01 OF 04 271902Z

THE LESS SOPHISTICATED WEAPONS WHICH HANG ON STANDARD NATO
MOUNTINGS. BUT THE EFFECTIVENESS OF MODERN TACTICAL AIR
IS VERY DEPENDENT ON MORE SOPHISTICATED MUNITIONS AND GUIDANCE
SYSTEMS AND BY AND LARGE, AIRFIELDS THROUGHOUT ACE ARE EQUIPPED
AND SUPPLIED ONLY TO BE ABLE TO SERVICE AND RE-ARM THOSE
AIRCRAFT WITH THESE MORE EFFECTIVE SYSTEMS WHICH ARE IN THE
INVENTORY OF THE NATION ON WHOSE TERRITORY THE AIRFIELD LIES
OR WITH WHOM A SPECIFIC PRIOR ARRANGEMENT HAS BEEN MADE.
THEREFORE IF AIRCRAFT OF A DIFFERENT MAKE FROM ANOTHER ALLY
LAND ON ONE OF THESE AIRFIELDS AFTER EXPENDING THEIR MUNITIONS,
THEY MAY WELL NOT BE ABLE TO BE SERVICED AND RE-ARMED EFFECTIVELY.
AT LEAST NOT UNTIL AFTER THAT ALLY HAS DEPLOYED A SERVICING

CAPABILITY AND ESTABLISHED A LOGISTICS CHAIN TO THAT AIRFIELD.
THERE ARE, HOWEVER, OVER 20 DIFFERENT AIRCRAFT TYPES IN THE
ACTIVE INVENTORIES OF THE VARIOUS MEMBERS OF THE ALLIANCE,
AND A GROWING DIVERSITY IN THEIR MUNITIONS. THEREFORE THE
FLEXIBILITY WITH WHICH NATO CAN UTILIZE ITS TACTICAL AIR
RESOURCES IS SIGNIFICANTLY CONSTRAINED.

ASSUME, HOWEVER, THAT ALLIED AIRCRAFT ARE RESUPPLIED
AND CAN TAKE OFF. WE DO NOT HAVE COMMON IFF SYSTEMS, DOCTRINE
OR PROCEDURE, SO THE ALLIED AIRCRAFT MUST FOLLOW CUMBERSOME
RULES OF ENGAGEMENT.

CONSIDER NATO NAVAL FORCES OPERATING TOGETHER,
FOR EXAMPLE IN SEA LANE DEFENCE. REMEMBER IT IS THE COMBINED
FORCES OF THE ALLIANCE OPERATING TOGETHER WHICH MUST BE ABLE
TO DISCHARGE THIS MISSION.

BUT TO-DAY IN NATO NAVIES THERE ARE:

100 DIFFERENT TYPES OF SHIPS OF DESTROYER OR LARGER
CLASSES;

36 DIFFERENT TYPES OF RADARS FOR FIRE CONTROL, ETC.;

40 DIFFERENT TYPES OF GUNS OF 30 MM OR LARGER
CALIBRE;

THEREFORE NEARLY 40 DIFFERENT TYPES OF AMMUNITION
TO BE MANUFACTURED AND DISTRIBUTED TO AN ALLIED
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PAGE 04 NATO 00427 01 OF 04 271902Z

FLOTILLA.

IF A NATO FORCE AT SEA TO-DAY EXPENDS ITS WEAPONS,
IT CANNOT REPLENISH AT SEA UNLESS EACH NATION'S LOGISTICS
SHIPS REPLENISH ITS OWN FORCES.

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PAGE 01 NATO 00427 02 OF 04 271920Z

63

ACTION EUR-12

INFO OCT-01 ISO-00 SS-15 NSC-05 CIAE-00 PM-03 INR-07 L-02

ACDA-05 NSAE-00 PA-01 RSC-01 PRS-01 SP-02 USIA-06

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C O N F I D E N T I A L SECTION 2 OF 4 USNATO 0427

ANTI-TANK WEAPONS.

TWELVE MEMBERS OF THE ALLIANCE AT PRESENT HAVE IN THEIR COMBINED INVENTORIES THIRTEEN DIFFERENT TYPES OF INDIVIDUAL CLOSE-RANGE ANTI-TANK WEAPONS, SIX DIFFERENT TYPES OF SHORT-RANGE ANTI-TANK MISSILES, SEVEN DIFFERENT TYPES OF MEDIUM-RANGE MISSILES, AND FIVE DIFFERENT TYPES OF LONG-RANGE SYSTEMS. OVER THE NEXT FIVE YEARS MOST OF THESE NATIONS PLAN PROCUREMENTS TO REPLACE SOME OF THEIR PRESENT INVENTORIES. THESE PLANS INCLUDE PROCUREMENT OF FOUR DIFFERENT TYPES OF IMPROVED INDIVIDUAL CLOSE-RANGE WEAPONS, SIX DIFFERENT IMPROVED SHORT-RANGE MISSILES, FOUR TYPES OF IMPROVED MEDIUM-RANGE MISSILES, AND FOUR UPGRADED LONG-RANGE SYSTEMS.

THIS DIVERSITY OF WEAPONS IMPOSES SEVERE CONSTRAINTS IN JOINT OPERATIONS. EACH TYPE REQUIRES UNIQUE TRAINING, MUNITIONS AND MAINTENANCE, AND SO THE WEAPONS AND THEIR LOGISTICS CANNOT READILY BE SHARED.

AIR-TO-AIR MISSILES.

MOST OF OUR ALLIES PLAN TO REPLACE THEIR PRESENT AIR-TO-AIR MISSILES IN THE LATE 1970S. THERE ARE FOUR ALTERNATIVE SHORT-RANGE AIR-TO-AIR MISSILES CURRENTLY IN CONFIDENTIAL
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PAGE 02 NATO 00427 02 OF 04 271920Z

DEVELOPMENT. ALL ARE ON ABOUT THE SAME SCHEDULE. IF WE WERE ALL TOGETHER TO SELECT JUST ONE, IT WOULD GREATLY FACILITATE JOINT FORCE OPERATIONS. POSSIBLE WE SHOULD SELECT TWO IN ORDER TO COMPLICATE THE ENEMY'S COUNTER-MEASURES PROBLEM. BUT TODAY WE SEE FOUR DEVELOPMENTS. THEY DIFFER BECAUSE THE PREFERRED DOCTRINES FOR THEIR USE DIFFER, SO THAT THE RELATIVE STRESS LAID ON VARIOUS DESIGN FEATURES IS DIFFERENT. THE US, FOR EXAMPLE, GIVES A HIGH PRIORITY TO THE ABILITY TO FIRE TOWARDS A TARGET WHATEVER THE DIRECTION MAY BE FROM THE FRIENDLY AIRCRAFT TOWARDS THE TARGET. THIS PRIORITY REFLECTS AN EMPHASIS ON THE ONE-ON-ONE DOG FIGHT ROLE WHICH DERIVES FROM US EXPERIENCE OVER NORTH VIETNAM. OTHERS STRESS THE MORE RESTRICTED ANGLES OF ATTACK THEY DERIVE FROM ANALYSIS OF MANY-AGAINST-MANY AIR BATTLES IN CENTRAL EUROPE.

AIR-TO-SURFACE MISSILES FOR AIRFIELD ATTACK.

ONE OF THE NATO ARMAMENTS GROUPS HAD DISCOVERED THAT THERE WERE FOUR NATIONS EACH WORKING TO IMPROVE 2.75 INCH ROCKETS FOR PENETRATION OF AIRCRAFT SHELTERS. THE FOUR NATIONS HAVE GOTTEN TOGETHER AND IT NOW APPEARS WE MAY HAVE A SINGLE NATO-WIDE STANDARD DEVELOPMENT. THERE ARE TWO DIFFERENT AIR-STRIP CRATERING SYSTEMS IN EARLY PHASES OF ADVANCED DEVELOPMENT. WE HAVE NOT SUCCEEDED IN PULLING THEM TOGETHER INTO A CO-ORDINATED PROGRAMME AIMED AT A SINGLE NATO STANDARD. THERE ARE FIVE DIFFERENT AREAS DENIAL WEAPONS SYSTEMS IN ADVANCED DEVELOPMENT. WE HAVE NOT BEEN ABLE TO REACH AGREEMENT TO AIM FOR THE SELECTION OF ONE FOR ALL. THIS TIME WE ARE TOLD IT IS TOO EARLY* NO NATION IS YET READY EVEN TO PLAN FOR A DESIGN COMPETITION LEADING TO SELECTION.

SURFACE-TO-AIR MISSILES.

NATO HAS A DE FACTO STANDARDIZATION OF SAM BECAUSE MOST COUNTRIES POSSESS US DESIGNED NIKE-HERCULES SYSTEMS. THESE ARE, HOWEVER, APPROACHING THE END OF THEIR USEFUL LIVES. SEVERAL NATIONS PLAN REPLACEMENTS IN 1980-83. THERE ARE CONFIDENTIAL
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PAGE 03 NATO 00427 02 OF 04 271920Z

FOUR DIFFERENT MEDIUM SAM SYSTEMS CURRENTLY IN DEVELOPMENT. THE UK AND THE FRENCH ARE NEGOTIATING A MEMORANDUM OF UNDERSTANDING TO BRING THEIR REQUIREMENTS AND DEVELOPMENTS TOGETHER. THE US AND THE GERMANS ARE EXPLORING A SIMILAR POSSIBILITY TOGETHER. THUS WE MAY SEE FOUR REDUCED TO TWO. UNQUOTE.

3. I RECENTLY WROTE A PAPER ON STANDARDIZATION AND THE JOINT DEFENCE. HERE ARE SOME PERTINENT EXTRACTS:

A MORE RECENT EXAMPLE OF AGREEMENT TO CO-OPERATE TOWARDS THE GOAL OF STANDARDIZATION CONCERNS AN OVER-THE-HORIZON ANTI-SHIP MISSILE. AGREEMENT HAS BEEN REACHED AMONG ALL NATO NAVIES ON THE GENERAL REQUIREMENTS FOR SUCH A MISSILE AND ON A STAFF OPERATIONAL OBJECTIVE, AND A PLAN HAS BEEN ADOPTED SETTING OUT THE STEPS INVOLVED IN A COLLABORATIVE PROJECT FOR ITS DEVELOPMENT AND PRODUCTION. THE CHARACTERISTICS HAVE BEEN AGREED, AND THE NATO INDUSTRIAL ADVISORY GROUP WILL SOON UNDERTAKE A PRE-FEASIBILITY STUDY AND MAKE TECHNICAL PROPOSALS ON WHAT CAN BE ACHIEVED. THIS IS AN EXCELLENT OPPORTUNITY FOR STANDARDIZING A NEW WEAPON SYSTEM AS THERE ARE NO CURRENT NATIONAL PROGRAMMES, AND IT IS ANTICIPATED THAT THERE WILL BE A WIDE NEED FOR SUCH A MISSILE IN THE NEXT DECADE.

EVEN WHERE CO-OPERATIVE WEAPONS PROJECTS HAVE BEEN ESTABLISHED WITHIN NATO, THE AVERAGE NUMBER OF NATIONS PARTICIPATING HAS BEEN 3.6. AS THE MINIMUM FOR CO-OPERATION IS TWO, AND THERE ARE FIFTEEN MEMBER COUNTRIES OF THE ALLIANCE,

THIS IS NOT A VERY HIGH AVERAGE. THE RESULT IS THAT THERE CAN STILL BE SEVERAL ALTERNATIVE SYSTEMS EACH ADOPTED BY A FEW ALLIES, INSTEAD OF A NATO-WIDE STANDARD.

THE DEVELOPMENT OF ALTERNATIVE WEAPON SYSTEMS WOULD NOT BE HARMFUL IF THE ALTERNATIVES WERE COMPETED AGAINST COMMON CRITERIA AND ONLY THE MOST COST-EFFECTIVE SELECTED. BUT THIS IS USUALLY NOT WHAT HAPPENS. EACH NATION GENERALLY CHOOSES THE SYSTEM IT HAS DEVELOPED OR IN WHOSE DEVELOPMENT IT HAS COLLABORATED. THUS ALTERNATIVE DEVELOPMENTS LEAD TO ALTERNATIVE WEAPONS IN ALLIANCE INVENTORIES RATHER THAN TO THE ESTABLISHMENT OF A SUPERIOR NATO-WIDE STANDARD.

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PAGE 01 NATO 00427 03 OF 04 272021Z

63

ACTION EUR-12

INFO OCT-01 ISO-00 SS-15 NSC-05 CIAE-00 PM-03 INR-07 L-02

ACDA-05 NSAE-00 PA-01 RSC-01 PRS-01 SP-02 USIA-06

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TO SECDEF WASHDC

INFO SECSTATE WASHDC 9765

C O N F I D E N T I A L SECTION 3 OF 4 USNATO 00427

BY THIS MEANS, NOT ONLY ARE RESEARCH AND DEVELOPMENT RESOURCES BEING DISSIPATED BUT, MORE SERIOUSLY, FORCES ARE BEING CREATED WHICH ARE NOT EFFICIENT IN JOINT OPERATIONS. LET US LOOK FOR A MOMENT AT THE ACE MOBILE FORCE (AMF) WHICH CONSISTS OF UNITS FROM SEVEN MEMBER COUNTRIES. IT HAS ABOUT 5,000 MEN ON THE GROUND COMPLEMENTED BY AN AIR ARM. THE UNITS IN THE FORCE TRAIN TOGETHER; THEY OPERATE TOGETHER; IN ANY CRISIS THEY WOULD DEPLOY TOGETHER TO CRITICAL AREAS, AND COULD WELL BE THE FIRST INTEGRATED NATO FORCES ON THE SCENE. THEY SYMBOLIZE THE COHESIVENESS OF THE ALLIANCE. BUT LET US LOOK AT HOW WELL THEY ARE STANDARDIZED. WITH SEVEN NATIONS

CONTRIBUTING, THERE ARE SEVEN DIFFERENT TYPES OF COMBAT AIRCRAFT IN THE AIR ARM; THERE ARE SIX DIFFERENT TYPES OF RECOILLESS RIFLES; THREE DIFFERENT WIRE-GUIDED ANTI-TANK WEAPONS. THIS FORCE IS PREPARED TO DEPLOY TO ANY OF SIX DIFFERENT CRITICAL AREAS IN TIME OF CRISIS, AND OBVIOUSLY CANNOT PRE-POSITION ITS SUPPLIES IN EACH OF THESE POSSIBLE AREAS. BECAUSE THEIR WEAPONS AND SUPPLIES ARE SO DIVERSE, EACH OF THE SEVEN NATIONAL UNITS IN THIS FORCE MUST MAINTAIN ITS OWN LOGISTICS PERSONNEL

AND ESTABLISH ITS OWN LOGISTIC SUPPORT. BECAUSE THE WEAPONS AND SUPPLIES OF THE AMF UNITS ARE NOT STANDARDIZED WITH THOSE OF THE HOST COUNTRIES INTO WHICH THEY ARE PREPARED TO DEPLOY, THEY CANNOT PLAN INITIALLY TO DRAW ON HOST COUNTRY SUPPLIES AND REPLENISH THEM IN DUE COURSE; THEY MUST BRING THEIR FULL SUPPLIES WITH THEM AB INITIO.

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PAGE 02 NATO 00427 03 OF 04 272021Z

THE COMMANDER OF THE AMF HAS DETERMINED THAT, IF ARMAMENTS WERE STANDARDIZED BOTH WITHIN HIS FORCE AND WITH THE POTENTIAL HOST COUNTRY, THEN THE TIME FOR HIS FORCES TO DEPLOY AND BE COMBAT READY COULD BE CUT TO LESS THEN HALF WHAT IT IS TODAY* TO PUT THIS FACTOR OF TWO INTO PERSPECTIVE, IT SHOULD BE RECALLED THAT IN VIRTUALLY EVERY ANALYSIS OF EAST-WEST BALANCES, NATO'S RESPONSE TIME IS ONE OF THE MOST CRITICAL DETERMINING PARAMETERS. THE AFM COMMANDER HAS ALSO ESTIMATED THAT WITH SUCH STANDARDIZATION THE SEVEN LOGISTIC STAFFS COULD BE CONSOLIDATED AND THEIR TASKS SIMPLIFIED SO AS TO GET THE SAME JOB DONE WITH ONE-HALF THE LOGISTIC PERSONNEL* TO PUT THIS FACTOR OF TWO REDUCTION IN PERSONNEL INTO PERSPECTIVE, IT SHOULD BE RECALLED THAT ESCALATING MANPOWER COSTS ARE EATING INFO MODERNIZATION BUDGETS THROUGHOUT THE ALLIANCE. FINALLY, THE AMF COMMANDER ESTIMATES HIS AIRLIFT REQUIREMENT WOULD BE CUT IN HALF, THUS GENERATING A MAJOR EQUIPMENT SAVING. ALL OF THESE IMPROVEMENTS AND SAVINGS MIGHT HAVE RESULTED HAD THE ALLIES SPENT THE SAME LEVEL OF RESOURCES THEY ACTUALLY DID SPEND, TO ACQUIRE THE SAME NUMBERS OF THE SAME CLASSES OF WEAPONS, IF THEY HAD FIRST AGREED TO ADOPT COMMON STANDARDS.

THE IMPORTANT THING ABOUT THE AMF IS THAT ITS EXPERIENCE IS REPRESENTATIVE OF THE PROBLEMS AND OPPORTUNITIES PRESENTED BY THE JOINT OPERATION OF LARGER UNITS AND OF THE ALLIANCE AS A WHOLE. SIMILAR LESSONS ARE ALSO EMERGING FROM THE EXPERIENCES OF THE NATO STANDING NAVAL FORCE IN THE ATLANTIC AND THE CHANNEL, AND FROM NATO EXERCISES. THEY DEMONSTRATE SIGNIFICANT IMPEDIMENTS TO JOINT OPERATIONAL EFFECTIVENESS AND SIGNIFICANT INCREASES IN LOGISTIC COSTS RESULTING FROM THE LACK OF STANDARDIZATION OF FUELS, AMMUNITION, ARMAMENTS AND SUPPLIES. THE LACK OF COMMON FREQUENCIES AND CODES FOR DATA TRANSMISSION AND OF STANDARD SYSTEMS FOR IDENTIFICATION OF FRIEND OR FOE, MOREOVER, HAVE BEEN SHOWN IN RECENT EXERCISES TO INCREASE ALARMINGLY THE RATE OF FRATRICIDE (OR INADVERTANT NATO DESTRUCTION OF NATO AIRCRAFT) IN A CONFLICT. OF THE 56 NATO MARITIME PATROL AIRCRAFT WHICH WERE (THEORETICALLY) SHOT DOWN IN ONE RECENT EXERICSE, FOR EXAMPLE, SUBSEQUENT ANALYSIS SHOWED THAT 30 WERE ATTRIBUTABLE TO NATO WEAPONS*

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PAGE 03 NATO 00427 03 OF 04 272021Z

THE NATO ALLIES HAVE ALL AGREED, FOR EXAMPLE, TO AN EFFORT TO HARMONIZE THEIR REQUIREMENTS FOR THE NEXT GENERATION OF ANTI-TANK WEAPONS AND TO CO-OPERATE IN THE DEVELOPMENT AND PRODUCTION OF A SINGLE FAMILY OF FIVE WEAPONS TO REPLACE THE 31 NOW IN INVENTORY. THE MAJOR RANK PRODUCING COUNTRIES HAVE AGREED TO A COMMON TESTING PROGRAMME TO SELECT THE MAIN GUN AND AMMUNITION TO BE COMMON FOR FUTURE ALLIANCE TANKS. WE ARE APPROACHING AGREEMENT ON A COMMON LIGHTWEIGHT ASW TORPEDO FOR THE 1980S.

IT MIGHT BE ADDED THAT PROSPECTS HAVE ALSO IMPROVED FOR AGREEMENT ON SMALL ARMS AMMUNITION. AT A CNAD MEETING LAST OCTOBER, IT WAS DECIDED THAT THERE SHOULD BE ONLY TWO CALIBRES FOR LIGHT INFANTRY WEAPONS, ONE OF WHICH SHOULD BE THE EXISTING NATO 7.62 MM ROUND. FURTHERMORE, IT WAS DECIDED THAT WHEREVER POSSIBLE, NO NATION SHOULD INTRODUCE ANY OTHER CALIBRE INTO ITS INVENTORIES BEFORE THE RESULTS OF AN AGREED TEST AND EVALUATION PROGRAMME BECAME AVAILABLE. WHERE, HOWEVER, COUNTRIES DO HAVE TO ACQUIRE NEW LIGHT INFANTRY WEAPONS BEFORE THIS PROGRAMME IS COMPLETED, IT WAS AGREED THAT THEY SHOULD INTRODUCE THESE WEAPONS ON AN INTERIM BASIS ONLY, OR FILL THE GAP IN THEIR STOCKS BY LEASING OR BORROWING SUPPLIES OF SUCH WEAPONS FROM ANOTHER NATION.

CONFIDENTIAL

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PAGE 01 NATO 00427 04 OF 04 272053Z

63

ACTION EUR-12

INFO OCT-01 ISO-00 SS-15 NSC-05 CIAE-00 PM-03 INR-07 L-02

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C O N F I D E N T I A L SECTION 4 OF 4 USNATO 0427

4. I HAVE BEEN LOOKING INTO MINE COUNTERMEASURES IN ALLIED COMMAND CHANNEL. SOME PERTINENT STANDARDIZATION POINTS IN THIS AREA ARE:

THE FOLLOWING TYPICAL FACTORS HAVE MADE IT DIFFICULT TO EMPLOY MINESWEEPERS OF DIFFERENT NATO NATIONS SIMULTANEOUSLY IN ONE MINESWEEPING TASK:

A. DIFFERENT SWEEPING SPEEDS

B. WITH INFLUENCE SWEEPS STREAMED, SOME SWEEPERS CAN ONLY TURN TO PORT AT THE END OF LAPS WHEREAS OTHERS HAVE TO TURN TO STARBOARD

C. DIFFERENT MAGNETIC SWEEP AND MAGNETIC SWEEP PULSE GENERATOR FORMS AND CURRENTS WHICH PRODUCE DIFFERENT SWEPT PATHS. THIS NORMALLY MAKES STATISTICAL EVALUATION OF RESULTS OF SWEEPING BY A MIXED FORCE TEDIOUS, IF NOT OPERATIONALLY IMPRACTICABLE.

D. DIFFERENT ACOUSTIC SWEEPS: THIS ADDS TO THE IMponderABLES OF STATISTICAL EVALUATION AND, ALSO, WOULD UNDOUBTEDLY, IN WAR, CAUSE ANXIETY TO THE LOCAL OPERATIONAL COMMANDER AND THE OTC AS TO THE SAFETY OF THE SWEEPERS.

AFTER OPERATING STANAVFORCHAN (STANDING NAVAL MCM FORCE CHANNEL) FOR LESS THAN ONE YEAR THE FOLLOWING DISCREPENCIES DUE TO A LACK OF STANDARDIZATION HAVE BEEN BROUGHT FORWARD:

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PAGE 02 NATO 00427 04 OF 04 272053Z

A. COMMUNICATIONS: NOT ALL SHIPS ARE ISSUED WITH THE CORRECT CRYSTALS TO IMPLEMENT THE FREQUENCIES LAID DOWN.

B. ALL FOUR SHIPS HAVE DIFFERENT EQUIPMENT FOR TRANSFER AT SEA, WHICH IS NOT ALWAYS COMPATIBLE.

C. SHIPS IN THE FORCE OPERATE ON DIFFERENT ELECTRICITY SUPPLIES. IT IS NOT ALWAYS POSSIBLE THEREFORE TO SUPPLY THE NEEDS OF ALL THE SHIPS IN PORT.

D. THE DIFFERENT DESIGNS AND SIZES OF SWEEPS, BOTH WIRE AND INFLUENCE, CAUSE VARIATIONS IN THE SWEPT DEPTH AND POSSIBLE CHANGES IN THE INFLUENCE COUNT ACHIEVED, THUS MAKING IT IMPOSSIBLE TO CALCULATE THE ACTUAL SWEPT PATH. SHIPS OPERATE AT DIFFERENT SPEEDS AND REQUIRE DIFFERENT TIMES TO STREAM AND RECOVER THEIR EQUIPMENT, MAKING TEAM SWEEPING A DIFFICULT PROCESS.

E. ASSISTED MAINTANANCE PERIODS MUST BE CARRIED OUT IN THE COUNTRY OF ORIGIN AND SPARE PARTS, FOR VIRTUALLY ALL EQUIPMENT, MUST COME FROM THE VESSELS OWN COUNTRY, THUS TIME IS WASTED WHEN ASSISTED MAINTENANCE PERIODS OR REPAIRS ARE REQUIRED.

F. ALL THE DIFFERENT EQUIPMENTS BEING USED BY NATO FORCES IS BECOMING THE EXCUSE FOR NATO MCM PUBLICATIONS TO HAVE NATIONAL ANNEXES OR PAGES. THIS IS CAUSING MORE AND MORE DISCUSSION AND GREATER INABILITY FOR SHIPS OF DIFFERENT NATIONS TO WORK TOGETHER, AND ALSO DISCREDITING THE NATO PUBLICATIONS CONCERNED.

G. THE PROBLEM OF DETACHING STANDING NAVAL FORCE CHANNEL WITH A SUPPORT VESSEL, AWAY FROM BASE FACILITIES, IS ONE WHICH DEFIES

THE IMAGINATION TAKING INTO ACCOUNT THE RANGES OF STORES THAT WOULD HAVE TO BE CARRIED AND THE AMOUNT OF EXPERTISE REQUIRED.

TAKING CONSTRUCTION DATES AND AN OPTIMISTIC 30 YEARS LIFETIME INTO CONSIDERATION, SOME 250 MCMV'S NOW IN SERVICE WITHIN NATO NAVIES AROUND THE NORTH SEA AND THE CHANNEL WILL PHASE OUT DURING THE EARLY 1980'S. DETAILS OF MCM FORCES PHASING OUT ARE SHOWN PER NATION IN ANNEX A.

MOST OF THE MCMV'S WERE INDEED BUILT IN THE EARLY 1950'S JUST AFTER THE KOREAN WAR. THE 8-DAY DELAY OF THE U.N. LANDING FORCES
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PAGE 03 NATO 00427 04 OF 04 272053Z

AT WONSAN REVITALIZED MCM TO A GREAT EXTENT DURING THAT PERIOD, AND MUST BE SEEN AS THE DIRECT CAUSE OF THE HUGE CONSTRUCTION PROGRAMME OF THE MCM VESSELS WHICH ARE NOW REACHING THE END OF THEIR SERVICE LIFE.

A GREAT NUMBER OF THESE VESSELS ARE OF US ORIGIN AND CARRY US NAVY EQUIPMENT. BUT OTHER INDUSTRIAL EUROPEAN COUNTRIES LIKE UK, FR, GE AND NL DESIGNED THEIR OWN MCM VESSELS AND EQUIPMENT AND HAVE PRODUCED THEM EITHER IN COLLABORATION OR ON THEIR OWN.

SINCE THEN THE MILITARY AGENCY FOR STANDARDIZATION HAS BEEN PUTTING A GREAT AMOUNT OF EFFORT IN ORDER TO ACHIEVE INTER-CHANGEABILITY OF MINESWEEPING GEARS, BUT THE RESULTS HAVE BEEN VERY POOR. GE AS CUSTODIAN OF THE NAVY/J/43 STUDY ON THE SUBJECT HAS CONDUCTED A LENGTHY INVESTIGATION ON THE MATTER, WHEREBY A GERMAN MINESWEEPER WENT TO ALL NATO PORTS IN ORDER TO CONDUCT TRIALS ON INTERCHANGEABILITY OF MAGNETIC SWEEPS. THE STUDY IS PROGRESSING VERY SLOWLY AND HAS, UP TILL NOW, ONLY PRODUCED A FEW STANDARDIZATION AGREEMENTS.

IT IS NOTICEABLE TO READ ONE NATION'S COMMENT DURING THE COURSE OF THE STUDY, WHICH STATED THAT STANDARDIZATION SHOULD NOT BE AIMED AT BECAUSE IT COULD SLOW DOWN OR EVEN PRECLUDE POSSIBLE IMPROVEMENTS ON EXISTING MCM EQUIPMENT.

PAST EXPERIENCE HAS SO FAR SHOWN THAT STANDARDIZATION THROUGH INTER-CHANGEABILITY IS ALMOST IMPOSSIBLE TO ACHIEVE. THEREFORE THE OPPORTUNITY THAT CHANNEL NATIONS HAVE NOW TO REPLACE THEIR MCM FORCES IN BULK MUST BE EXPLOITED TO THE MAXIMUM. MISSING THIS OPPORTUNITY WOULD BE A CAPITAL ERROR. UNQUOTE.
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